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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Chaykin supports an approach to the issue of mediator
liability that holds a mediator liable for his conduct in a limited number
of circumstances.' Such an approach assumes a particular conception
of the mediator's role and, hence, what constitutes "mediating acts." I
disagree with Professor Chaykin's assumptions regarding the mediator's
role, and consequently, find his conclusions regarding mediator liability
unpersuasive.
I have previously offered a more fully developed conception of the
mediation process and the mediator's role.2 As an extension of these
writings, this Article sets forth a thesis for mediator immunity and
proposes that legislation be drafted holding a mediator completely im-
mune from legal liability for all actions undertaken in his role as mediator.
I shall defend this thesis by examining three paradigm settings in which
considerations of mediator liability conventionally arise. These settings
involve occasions when (1) a mediated settlement does not reflect the
optimal possible outcome and the mediator fails to oppose its adoption,
or, in fact, encourages the particular settlement terms; (2) some person
or party to a mediation session is harmed by another party and arguably
the mediator could have prevented the harm from occurring; and (3)
the mediation process is used to promote or camouflage illegal conduct
of which the mediator could have alerted the appropriate authorities.
II. NON-OPTIMAL OUTCOMES
No mediator should be held liable if parties agree to settlement terms
that do not optimize their interests or fully capitalize on their rights.
This principle is not only desirable but also well established. For example,
a mediator cannot be held legally liable for allowing a union to accept
a wage proposal that is less favorable relative to other recently negotiated
settlements, or that is less favorable in comparison to the cost of living
rate or some other comparable standard. The union has its reasons for
acting as it does and it is not normally viewed as the mediator's role
to stop the union from accepting an offer it deems adequate.' If the
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employer's strategy of "starting low" deters union representatives from
asking for more, the mediator should not be legally liable for permitting
the union to accept that offer. The same analysis applies to parties
negotiating the settlement of employment discrimination claims, and
maintenance and support disputes in divorce proceedings.
People feel less confident about granting immunity to a mediator
who permits a "power imbalance" among the negotiating parties.4 Some
proponents argue that a mediator has a duty to realign such imbalances
and that his failure to take action to redress the imbalance should result
in a liability claim. This position reflects a fundamental misconception
of the mediator's role.
Parties to a dispute almost invariably have unequal positions of power.
The negotiators of the parties may have "unequal" analytical or linguistic
skills or the resources may be skewed in one party's favor. The argument
that a mediator has a duty to redistribute the power or, at a minimum,
has a duty not to permit the mediation process to reinforce this power
disparity in the settlement terms has two significant analytical defects.
First, if it is the mediator's responsibility to redistribute power resources,
then his job no longer is that of promoting settlement. Instead, the
mediator assumes the role of a mini-legislator charged with promoting
the social welfare. Whether this role is a useful social service that
deserves support and protection is a separate issue. Notwithstanding this
issue, such a role certainly differs from our conventional image of a
mediator's responsibilities. Second, persons who claim that a mediator
has a duty to realign the power imbalance falsely assume that it is
possible to identify the various sources of power and assess the power
dynamics in a given situation. Even if it were possible to identify and
assess the power structure, no common standard enalles us to determine
if the power is "balanced." To construct mediator liability claims on
the basis of the mediator's mismanagement of power imbalances is
building on intellectual quicksand.
Mediator liability can also arise when parties operate under an
erroneous assumption that a mediator "should have" recognized and
corrected erroneous information, or when a mediator provides such
information to the parties. In this context, some proponents argue that
a mediator should be held liable for his negligent behavior or malpractice.
The appeal of holding a mediator liable under such circumstances is
very strong, but it rests upon a misunderstanding of how a mediator
interacts with the parties.
For example, we can envision a divorce mediator providing the parties
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with erroneous information (deliberately or not) regarding the tax con-
sequences of certain financial arrangements. Such an example represents
the image of disputants using the mediator as an expert resource.
However, this view is at odds with the dynamics of most mediation
conferences in which the negotiating parties, with or without represen-
tation, assert their priorities and identify their interests. The disputants
use the mediator to forge a common ground so they can secure their
goals. The mediator's success in helping the parties reach acceptable
settlement terms is enhanced if he is knowledgeable in the field because
that knowledge enriches his ability to envision options and possible
settlement formats. The mediator uses that information to develop an
agreement not to "advise" or "counsel" the parties on how to proceed.
The mediator does not simply dispense information to the parties, rather
he uses it strategically to fashion an accord. He blends that information
into a tactical approach to persuade the parties to reach settlement.
The image of a client approaching a lawyer for advice cannot be
transferred to the situation in which parties request a mediator to help
them resolve their dispute. The compelling attraction of holding a
mediator liable for negligence, however, derives from viewing the me-
diator-client relationship as akin to the attorney-client relationship. No
one endorses inept behavior by a mediator. If he gives incorrect advice,
there should be devices for relieving the parties of their obligations.
However, that issue can be addressed without requiring the mediator
to be held liable for damages.
A different situation is presented when the mediator deliberately
provides incorrect information so that one party's position is improved
at the expense of the other. A compelling argument can be made that
such conduct violates a mediator's duty to the parties and, as such, is
not a "mediating act" warranting immunity. This situation is a variation
of the matters discussed in Section C for which a mediator should be
held liable. Although liability might properly attach as an analytical
matter, there would be, as Professor Chaykin details, a significant proof
problem in sustaining such a claim.5
For all the situations addressed in this category, mediator immunity
from legal liability should be explicitly available.
III. HARM TO PARTIES
It seems odd to claim that a mediator should be immune from suit
in those instances in which a party suffered harm becauser the mediator
did not take affirmative steps to prevent the harm when in a position
to do so. In order to understand why such protection to a mediator is
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important, we must examine precisely why we think the mediation
process is valuable as a dispute resolution procedure.
As a preliminary matter, we must gain an understanding of the
concept of "harm." If what is meant by "harm" is simply that one or
more negotiating parties did not obtain the optimum outcome, then the
comments of the previous section apply. More typically, the term "harm"
refers to physical, psychological, or severe financial damage sustained
by one or more parties. For instance, if a mediator has been told by
one party in confidence that she plans to attack physically her negotiating
counterpart, then the issue arises whether the mediator has a duty to
inform someone in order to avert the harm. It is an unrealistic response
for a mediator to construe such a threat as a "negotiating" tactic.
However, sometimes a party, in an attempt to demonstrate how serious
she is about securing her proposal, may inform the mediator regarding
her plans to harm the other side if no concessions are made. No mediator
endorses such behavior and most mediators would attempt to persuade
the person from taking such action. The issue of liability focuses upon
whether the mediator has a duty to warn the potential victim of the
impending disaster.
It is important to examine the consequences of such a scenario to
appreciate how our biases affect our liability analysis. Suppose the
mediator warns Party A that Party B plans to assault her. After receiving
this information Party A immediately goes to a store to purchase a
pistol, and proceeds to Party B's home and shoots her. Under this
scenario should the mediator be liable to Party B or her estate? Although
it is argued that the mediator must reveal the impending danger to
Party A or be held liable, it has not been proposed that a mediator
should be liable for anything that might happen following his revelation
of the information. This position reflects an arbitrary bias in favor of
the first potential victim. There is also no moral basis for holding the
mediator liable in the first instance (preventing harm) that cannot apply
with equal force to holding her liable to Party B as well. The preferred
solution, as a matter of policy and practice, seems straightforward: the
mediator has no obligation to block such conduct once the mediation
conference has concluded and the mediator's duty is to incorporate
knowledge of such threats of harmful conduct into her aggressive efforts
to generate a settlement. Under this approach the mediator's knowledge
that one party might physically harm the other is no different in kind
than a mediator in a labor-management dispute who has knowledge that
a group of employees will spearhead an attack to destroy some of the
employer's machinery if the contract deadline expires without a settlement.
The apparent inconsistency discussed above may not be sufficient to
satisfy the advocate of mediator liability. To satisfy the advocate, it
may be necessary to probe more deeply and address whether there is
[Vol. 2:1 1986]
MEDIATOR IMMUNITY
any value in having a dispute settlement procedure that allows an actor
not to be liable for failing to prevent a serious harm that she had good
reason to believe would occur. At this level, the distinction between
harm inflicted on an individual who is a party to the mediation and
harm inflicted on individiuals who are affected by the behavior of
negotiating parties collapses. The argument in support of sustaining
mediator immunity at this level can be brought into sharper focus by
considering the mediator's duty when parties contemplate engaging in
illegal conduct.
IV. CONDUCT CONTRARY TO PUBLIC STANDARDS
Another concern is the extent of the mediator's duty upon learning
in a mediation conference that one or both of the parties is engaging
in, or plans to engage in conduct that is contrary to public standards.
For example, what should a mediator do if both parties agree to an
arrangement whereby one person hires the other but only on the condition
that the person works "off the books?"
In this analysis of mediator liability two separate considerations arise.
A mediator, particularly one who is paid with public funds, should not
encourage, permit, or assist parties to develop settlement terms that are
illegal. A contract containing illegal settlement terms is not enforceable,
and one should make no apologies for insisting that a mediator under
similar circumstances prevent the parties from consummating the deal
with his imprimatur. Even more obvious, an agreement to commit a
serious felony now implicates the mediator as an individual. Liability
should attach to all harms suffered by innocent parties as a result of
such conduct. While it is plausible to assert that a person can properly
claim to be mediating under such circumstances, no justification exists
for endorsing the process of mediation as a social institution in such
circumstances.
A distinction should be drawn between a mediator who jointly par-
ticipates in the development of an illegal scheme, and a mediator, who
while trying to develop an agreement, learns that a party has committed
or plans to commit an illegal act. No social utility exists in protecting
the first type of mediator behavior. However, there is significant value
in allowing the dispute settlement process to proceed even when the
parties who are embroiled in a controversy make threats or admit
wrongdoings in the mediator's presence. The mediator should be per-
mitted to use that information as an element in the settlement process
rather than using the information to stop all discussions. Examples will
illustrate this distinction.
Suppose that a female employee is a victim of a sexual assault and
she identifies her co-worker as the perpetrator. Assume further that the
co-worker publicly denies the charge but reveals to the mediator in
89
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caucus that he in fact committed the assault. If neither of the partie
wants to leave the work station, then how should the mediator proceedi
The mediator can assist the workers to develop settlement terms that
minimize the possibility of any future incidents by focusing the discussion
on such matters as desk location, supervisory review, staggered work
hours, and independent work assignments. Given the particular facts,
perhaps there is no viable way in which to structure an arrangement
that minimizes the probability of the act occurring again. Ultimately,
this is something that the participants must decide, not the mediator.
What the mediator should do is to insist upon a consideration of
settlement terms that reflects the fact (though not publicly admitted)
that the incident occurred. There should not be any additional respon-
sibility imposed on the mediator either to report that fact to the
authorities in the event that no settlement is reached or to advise the
supervisor or female victim of the admission in the event the matter is
not resolved.
This view should be accepted because there is value in having a
dispute settlement process that focuses on shaping and structuring the
future relationship among the parties. This does not mean that what
has happened in the past is irrelevant. The gathering of information
about what has happened, through written documents or admissions, is
essential to making certain that the future is tempered by what has
occurred in the past. The mediation process does not require a formal
determination that ascribes responsibility and blame for past conduct
as a condition precedent to shaping the future. Similarly, the mediation
process is not compatible with imposing a legal duty on the mediator
to reveal a party's improper past conduct or threats of future harm,
for that converts the mediator from his role as a trusted intermediary
between the parties into an informant. Consider the mediator who
intervenes to stop a gang war in an urban area, the mediator who
attempts to develop an accord between civil authorities and prisoners
holding civilian hostages, or the mediator trying to resolve a dispute
between a school principal and a student regarding the student's sus-
pension for allegedly carrying weapons or drugs inside the school building.
It is a practical certainty that the mediator will learn that at least one
party has engaged in improper conduct or threatens future misconduct.
If the mediator is denied access to that information because the party
refuses to reveal it to him for fear of being "reported," then we are
handicapping him in his effort to help parties fashion a viable solution
to the problem that is predicated upon an accurate assessment of what
has happened in the past. If one believes that there is value in trying
to resolve such situations without relying exclusively upon the use of
force or the application of institutional rules in a formalized, adjudicatory
setting, then permitting a mediator to operate without exposure to legal
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liability is necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
To argue that a mediator should be protected legislatively from legal
liability is not to license any behavior by the person acting as a mediator.
Developing a proper conception of the mediator's role is essential in
assessing what constitutes "mediating" and "mediating acts" so that
immunity may attach to an individual performing such acts.

